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1 Introduction
In English, the tiny word all performs an impressive range of grammatical duties, which
despite their various differences all share the same core meaning: something we might call
‘maximality’, ‘completion’ or ‘totality’ (Dowty, 1987; Bobaljik, 1995; Brisson, 2003; Križ,
2015, and many others).
(1) a. All students passed the test / The students all passed the test.
≈ Each of the students passed the test.
b. All students gathered / The students all gathered.
≈ The totality of the students gathered.
c. All the town had turned out to see the game.
≈ The totality of the town (i.e. all its inhabitants) had turned out to see the
game.
d. All John’s lying has made him vulnerable to blackmail.
≈ The totality of John’s lying has made him vulnerable to blackmail.
e. Where all have you been? (McCloskey, 2000)
≈ Tell me each of the places you have been.
f. The soil was all dried out. (Bobaljik 1995,
Buchstaller & Traugott 2006; Burnett 2011)
≈ The soil has reached maximal dryness / the soil has every degree on the
dryness scale.
These occurrences of all are all ‘strong’ or presuppositional in the sense that they operate
on a predefined domain of reference, and express that a given property holds (collectively
or distributively) for the maximal sum of individuals in that domain.
In Dutch, all ’s cognate al appears in several distinct forms. Al (inflected form alle)
is mainly used prenominally, while allemaal (originally al temaal ‘all together’) is used
as a floating quantifier; these forms, together with the similarly alternating heel/hele and
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helemaal (‘whole/wholly’), cover the same grammatical territory as English all. I will refer















































































































‘The soil was all dried out.’
Yet, in both English and Dutch1, all has a second type of use (occasionally remarked upon
but, to my knowledge, never studied systematically), in which its contribution is both weak
and non-maximal. That is, the NPs headed by these forms of all introduce a novel domain
of reference and do not exhaust it; like other weak NPs, they may appear in existential there-
constructions. In most cases, this use - which I will refer to as weak all2 - can roughly be
paraphrased as ‘many’, ‘various’ or in the case of degree modification, ‘very’:
(4) a. There were all these people trying to sell me stuff.
1I will mostly limit my discussion to these two languages, but the observed patterns hold in other
languages too. For instance, Burnett (2011) notes that adverbial all in Romance systematically alternates
between an expression of totality and an intensifier, cf. our data in (1-f)/(6-a) and (3-c)/(6-b).
2Since the weak/strong distinction was first identified by Milsark (1974), there have been many at-
tempts to formalise it in terms of independently identifiable semantic properties of either determiners or full
NPs/DPs (e.g. Barwise & Cooper, 1981; McNally, 1992; de Hoop, 1995; Diesing, 1992; Ladusaw, 1994; van
Geenhoven & McNally, 1998, and many others). In order to avoid committing to a particular position, I will
use the more or less pretheoretical ‘weak/strong’ terminology even though it is not entirely appropriate for
all (as all is not usually a determiner). I will also describe ‘strong’ all as presuppositional and partitive
but this should not be taken as an endorsement of the position that the weak/strong distinction should be
reduced to presupposition or partitivity - just as an observation that all has these particular properties in
certain contexts.
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‘I heard all these girls sing (≈ I heard many girls sing).’
(5) a. I saw all kinds of weirdly dressed people at the train station.


















‘There was an assortment of bottles of liquor on the kitchen counter.’
(6) a. She got all angry at me.













‘She started acting all weird all of a sudden.’3
The persistence of this weak interpretation of all across different languages and different
forms suggests that it is not coincidental that all gets repurposed in this way. Nor is it a
peripheral phenomenon: while some of the forms in (6), or the this-indefinite in (4-a), may
appear nonstandard or colloquial, sentences like (4-b) and the use of heel in (6-b) are fully
acceptable in standard Dutch; the same applies to the all kinds/sorts/manner of construc-
tion in both English and Dutch, exemplified in (5). Thus, we are faced with a paradox: if
there is a linguistic reason why meanings like those in (4-6) are expressed using some form
of all, why do they lack the maximality that is commonly seen as the core meaning of all?
And if the core meaning of all is not maximality, how else can we describe its contribution
in the contexts in (1-2)?
The aim of this paper is twofold. The first, descriptive, goal is to provide an overview
of the syntactic, semantic, and discourse properties of weak all, all of which set it apart
from the strong all exemplified in (1) and (2). The second is to address the above paradox
by exploring some possibilities for a unified account of all that captures both its weak
and strong interpretations. I will argue at length that the core function of all is enforcing
semantic plurality, and will show how phenomena like maximality and degree intensification
may arise as compositional side effects of this core function.
After the data-focused section 2, the paper is structured as follows. In section 3, I argue
3While the combination of helemaal ‘wholly’ and a relative adjective like raar ‘weird’ or leuk ‘good,
nice, fun’ is seen as a low-register language innovation (the examples I have been able to find online were
all either from very colloquial forum environments, or from denunciatory columns by language purists),
the near-equivalent heel leuk/raar is an uncontroversial part of the standard language despite seemingly
expressing the same odd combination of an endpoint modifier and a relative adjective. Perhaps relatedly,
Buchstaller & Traugott (2006) observe that English constructions like (6-a) tend to be seen as innovative
and colloquial despite having been around since Old English.
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that a unified account of all should abandon the notion of maximality as its core property,
and I introduce my analysis of all as a plurality enforcer based on familiar data involving
adnominal strong all. I propose that economy principles active in linguistic computation
drive the avoidance of higher-order predication, which includes favouring atomic over plural
reference. I follow e.g. Link (1984); Landman (1989); Winter (2002), and de Vries (2015)
in assuming that the grammar employs a family of economy-driven type-shifts that map
(predicates over) sums to (predicates over) impure atoms, and propose that the function
of all is to block the atomisation of sums of entities, ensuring that referents remain se-
mantically plural. In section 4, I will extend this analysis to adnominal weak all. I will
argue that strong all applies to entities in the individual domain, while weak all applies
to kinds. Drawing inspiration from the aforementioned literature on impure atomicity, as
well as Dayal (2004) on the differences between singular and plural kind reference, I show
how the properties of weak all arise from the interaction of plurality enforcement with the
process of episodic predication over kinds. In section 5, I show how the analysis of all
as a plurality enforcer could be extended to adverbial (degree-modifying) all, borrowing
key ideas from Dotlačil & Nouwen (2016). Section 6 ties up some loose ends and briefly
addresses some unsolved issues. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Data
2.1 More on ‘weak’ and ‘strong’
There are various ways to show that weak all, in contrast to strong all, does not involve
the exhaustion (through universal quantification over or maximisation of) a previously in-
troduced set. For instance, transitive predicates whose object involves weak all are atelic,
while predicates formed with a strong all object (or with every) are telic. (7) shows that
prenominal allemaal, in contrast to floating allemaal and strong-only alle, is incompatible
with adverbial modifiers like binnen een kwartier ‘within 15 minutes’. (8) shows a similar
contrast between English all the (compatible with telic adverbials) and all these (incompat-
ible with telic adverbials). Conversely, (9) shows that weak all kinds of behaves differently
from strong all the/every kind of in a continuative construction: while (9-a) means that
the event of discovering mistakes is ongoing, (9-b) only has an iterative ‘amnesia reading’





















































‘I washed all the cups within 15 minutes’
(8) a. *In an hour, I found all these clues.
b. In an hour, I found all the clues.
(9) a. I kept discovering all kinds of mistakes in my draft.
b. #I kept discovering all the mistakes / every kind of mistake in my draft.
The compatibility of strong all with telic adverbials and other indicators of telicity is
intuitive: if the theme of the event is a finite, pre-defined set, the event will reach a natural
endpoint once that set is exhausted. In contrast, the grammatical behaviour of weak all
indicates that it does not provide such an endpoint, suggesting that the semantics of weak
all does not involve exhaustification of a pre-defined set.
Secondly, in contrast to its strong counterpart, weak all cannot head a partitive:
(10) a. I thought I made several new friends yesterday, but it turned out that all (of)
these people just wanted to sell me something.







































‘Two weeks before the start of the National Bird Week, virtually all of the more



















Intended: ‘I’ve been on many of the 400 bird excursions.’
The contrast in (10)-(11) indicates that the difference between strong and weak all is not
just a matter of ambiguous quantificational force, but that they impose different restrictions
on their complement: since the embedded DP in a partitive is always definite (Jackendoff,
1977), we conclude that weak all is incompatible with definite complements.
Just as weak all cannot head a partitive, (12) shows that weak all-NPs cannot be
embedded inside one. Neither can they be modified by endpoint-oriented expressions like
nearly, as ((13)) and (14) show.
4Source: https://www.vogelweek.nl/nieuws/bericht/?bericht=26. It should be noted that similar
examples with unmodified alle are really hard to find. According to my own judgement, the sentence in
(11-a) is a bit awkward, but it would be completely unacceptable without vrijwel ‘nearly, virtually’. While
the general unavailability of alle in partitives might be accounted for by assuming that inflected alle, unlike
English all, spells out a complex structure which includes a definite element (as proposed in e.g. Cirillo
2016), this does not explain why adding a modifier should improve it. In any case, the contrast between











































































‘Almost all respondents agree.’
(14) *There were nearly all these oddly dressed people at the party.
Finally, when an NP is modified by a PP restricting it to a finite set of particular individuals
in the context (e.g. the locative PP on my plate in (15-a) and (16-a)), it ceases to be
compatible with weak all (as well as other weak determiners). (In contrast, kind-level PP
modification (e.g. without gluten, from Paris)) is fine with weak determiners including weak
all, as (15-b) and (16-b) show.)





 petitfours op mijn bord gegeten.






 petitfours zonder gluten gegeten.
‘I ate all/both/SOME/many/no/sm petitfours without gluten.’
(16) a. I ate
{
all *all these
both *all kinds of
}




both all kinds of
}
petitfours from Paris.
The data above do not just show that the behaviour of weak all does not pattern with
its much more famous strong counterpart, but also point - in various independent ways
- at the nature of the difference. When the complement of all expresses a previously
defined finite set of entities, all is strong and expresses maximality of that particular set.
When the complement of all does not express such a previously established referent, all
is weak: it simply picks out some plurality of entities that have the property expressed by
its complement.
6
2.2 Weak and strong ALL in complementary distribution
Whether a particular member of the all-family is interpreted as strong or weak depends
on several factors. Some forms are always strong (English adnominal all, Dutch adnominal
alle), while some are always5 weak (English all kinds/sorts/manner of, Dutch allerlei).
(17) *Ik heb allerlei gerechten op mijn bord gegeten.
I have all-kind dishes on my plate eaten
‘I ate all kinds of food on my plate.’
(18) a. *I ate all kinds of food on my plate.
b. (compare) I ate every kind of food on my plate.
In other cases, the same form can be either strong or weak depending on syntactic position
(Dutch allemaal ; compare (19-a) and (19-b)), the predicate they occur with (English adver-
bial all ; compare (20-a) and (20-b)), or discourse context (English all these; compare the
sentences in (21)).
(19) a. Ik hoorde de meisjes allemaal zingen. (floating → strong)
b. Ik hoorde allemaal meisjes zingen. (prenominal → weak)
(20) a. The room was all empty. (closed scale → strong)
b. She got all angry. (open scale → weak)
(21) a. I passed 10 different people on my way here and all these people tried to sell
me something. (demonstrative these → strong)
b. There were all these people trying to sell me stuff. (indefinite these → weak)
When multiple factors coincide, syntactic position appears to have the final word. In (22-a),
but not (22-b), the property of trying to sell me stuff holds of the maximal set of the oddly
dressed people I am referring to - that is, all is strong - despite the fact that these people is
itself weak (a plural this-indefinite).
(22) a. There were these oddly dressed people all trying to sell me stuff.
⇒ All of the oddly dressed people that were there tried to sell me stuff.
b. There were all these oddly dressed people trying to sell me stuff.
6⇒ All of the oddly dressed people that were there tried to sell me stuff.
Summarising these various observations in a handy table, we obtain the following:
















alle (prenominal only) no yes
allerlei (prenominal only) yes no
Looking at the table, it is clear that interpretation is strongly correlated with syntactic
position. One observation that immediately jumps out is that floating all is always strong.
Secondly, if a particular form of all has both a strong and a weak use, they are in com-
plementary distribution, with the weak version in prenominal position. The reverse pattern
- if a form of all can occur in both positions, the prenominal position triggers a weak
interpretation - holds with the exception of English all, which is strong-only.
Putting the syntax together with the semantic observations from the previous section, I
conclude that the data support an analysis in which strong all applies to definite expressions
at the DP level, while weak all applies to indefinite expressions at the NP level - bare
plurals, this-indefinites or explicitly kind-denoting constructions. The only exception to
this pattern is English all, which is strong even in prenominal position:
(24) a. All the students came to the meeting.
b. All students came to the meeting.
c. *There were all (the) students present at the meeting.
It is sometimes claimed (e.g Partee, 1995; Brisson, 2003) that the combination of all with
a bare noun (as in (24-b)) is only grammatical in generic sentences (e.g. All cats are
introverts), in which case it expresses maximality of instances of a kind. This would suggest
that the complement of all always needs to be of type e (either a plural individual or a plural
kind). However, many episodic examples like the one in (24-b) can be found online, and
are judged grammatical by the native speakers I consulted. This suggests that all does not
always require an entity complement, but can sometimes behaves like an ordinary quantifier
(for example, as in Winter (2002), the plural counterpart of every). This idea is supported
by the division of labour between allemaal and alle in Dutch (I will refrain from adding
















‘All the students came to the meeting.’
b. Alle studenten kwamen naar de bijeenkomst.
c. De studenten kwamen allemaal naar de bijeenkomst.
d. ??De studenten kwamen alle naar de bijeenkomst.6
We see that alle can only be used pre-nominally, which suggests it is a quantifier.7 So, I
will assume that English all is polysemous between a plural quantifier of type 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉
with the traditional strong interpretation, and an optional operator of type 〈σ, σ〉 (with σ
to be determined later) that systematically alternates between strong and weak interpre-
tations depending on its syntactic position. This assumption means that we can disregard
prenominal all and Dutch alle under the assumption that they are quantifiers, and obtain
a full correlation between syntactic position and interpretation for our remaining cases of
all.
2.3 Miscellaneous observations
While my eventual analysis will be underpinned mostly by the data in the previous two sec-
tions, there are several other properties of weak all (and prenominal allemaal in particular)
that deserve mention.
2.3.1 Discourse properties: novelty, specificity and lack of individuation
Whether or not weak all is an appropriate way of referring to a plurality of many individuals
in a particular sentence strongly depends on the discourse context. In particular, NPs formed
with weak all can only be used to introduce a novel referent ((26) and (27) are translation
equivalents):
(26) Ik had tien vrienden uitgenodigd op mijn verjaardag. Er kwamen uiteindelijk...
a. #...allemaal vrienden.
b. ...allemaal buren.
6Judgements are a bit muddled here since the pronoun allen - which happens to be homophonous with
alle in many dialects of Dutch including the author’s - is grammatical in this position, at least in formal
language use. Insofar introspective judgements based purely on written sentences are valid, I believe (25-d)
is marginal at best. Note that I will leave pronominal forms of all (e.g. All have sinned) aside for the
purposes of this paper, but it seems to me that they can straightforwardly be accounted for by assuming
they are derived from quantificational all with its first argument implicitly saturated by a contextually
defined set (cf. everyone).
7It has been suggested (e.g Cirillo, 2016, see also footnote 3) that Dutch alle amounts to al de ‘all the’,
but while this could account for some of its behaviour (for example, the ungrammaticality of *alle de),
it leaves other data explained. For example, alle N but not al de N can be used in generic sentences, in
parallel to English all N versus all the N. At the very least, this suggests that Dutch alle does not always
incorporate a definite.
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c. ...zes/veel/geen/meer dan tien/een handjevol vrienden.
(27) I’d invited ten friends to my party. In the end there came...
a. #...all these friends.
b. ...all these neighbours.
c. ...six/many/no/more than ten/a handful of friends.
Often, the use of weak all additionally implies that the referent was new to the speaker





























‘All this water splashed into my face (all of a sudden).’
However, this ‘element of surprise’ is not obligatory, and allemaal may be used to introduce
referents familiar to the speaker. In this case, the referents resist individuation: intuitively,
their relevance to the discourse lies in some salient shared property, and their individual
identities are unimportant. This is demonstrated by the contrast in (29). In (29), the
speaker clearly has some familiar and specific people in mind, yet the continuation in (29-b)
is infelicitous, showing that the individual cookery lovers themselves cannot be picked up as
a discourse topic. As shown in (29-c), the problem is not that weak all-NPs fail to support
discourse anaphora: they do so just fine, as long as the referents continue to be discussed




















































‘No doubt they’ll be jealous of my new oven.’
A final note about novelty: one property of allemaal in particular is that it strongly






































‘All these girls came to the door with charity stamps.’
Other Dutch indefinites happily occur in both canonical and non-canonical subject position.
Some basic Google results are telling: een paar meisjes kwamen ‘a few girls came’ and er
kwamen een paar meisjes ‘there came a few girls’ both have around 225 hits; een meisje
kwam ‘a girl came’ and er kwam een meisje ‘there came a girl’ both have around 45,000
hits; but for allemaal there is a large difference between the two constructions: 14 hits for
allemaal meisjes kwamen (upon closer inspection, only 7 of those involve weak allemaal -NPs
in canonical subject position) against 107 for er kwamen allemaal meisjes.
I hypothesise that this pattern is related to the strong novelty requirement imposed by
weak allemaal, as the sentence-initial position occupied by canonical subjects is associated
with old information (Ward & Birner, 2004). In contrast, existential there-constructions
obligatorily introduce new referents, making them the perfect syntactic host to weak alle-
maal.
2.3.2 Spatiotemporal aspects of allemaal
An important distinction between weak and strong allemaal in Dutch is sensitivity to the
mass/count distinction: while strong allemaal is only grammatical with plural count nouns,


























‘All the water has drained away.’8
When weak allemaal appears with a mass NP, it expresses either spatiotemporal scattered-
ness of the referent or, somewhat less prominently, the presence of multiple subkinds of the
kind expressed by the NP. The Algemene Nederlandse Spraakkunst, the standard descriptive
grammar of modern Dutch, notes that weak allemaal “indicates a relatively large quantity
of something, usually spread over a relatively large area” (Haeseryn et al., 1997, p.353, my
translation). Spread or scatteredness also figures prominently in the comments on weak
8Although it should be noted that judgements vary here; in my own dialect, this sentence is strongly
unacceptable, but not all speakers agree with me. For example, for Johan Rooryck (p.c.), the use of strong
allemaal with mass nouns forces an individuated ‘multiple portions’ interpretation, so sentences like (32)
are acceptable in a context that involves multiple streams or puddles of water.
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allemaal I sourced from native speakers. For instance, people generally agreed that (33-a)
is good while (33-b) is bad, although one speaker remarked that (33-b) would be acceptable


























Intended: ‘I have eaten a lot of bread’
The same appears to hold for English all this N. Googling There was all this milk, for
example, yields only a handful of results, but they all involve milk dripping, leaking, or
covering a large surface - all rather atypical situations for milk, but expected if we assume
that weak all imposes a plurality requirement on its complement that can be met by the
involvement of multiple spatiotemporal locations. Similarly, most of the Google results for
There was all this glass describe situations involving scattered bits of broken glass (the few
exceptions relate to buildings with many large windows).
The observations in this section are all compatible with our earlier conclusion, reached
in section 2.2, that weak and strong all apply at different levels of the extended nominal
projection (NP and DP, respectively). Whatever the type of argument that weak all
applies to, the above data suggest that it incorporates spatiotemporal and/or taxonomical
information that is lost at the DP level. Hence, the plurality requirement of weak allemaal
can be met by plurality in the individual, kind or spatiotemporal domains, while at DP
level, a plurality of individuals is required in order to license strong allemaal.
3 A new semantics for ALL
3.1 Can we preserve maximality?
As mentioned in the introduction, the semantic contribution of all is usually taken to be
the expression of maximality : it expresses that a particular plural predicate applies to a
plurality without exceptions. Thus, while (34-a) is compatible with the existence of a few
girls who did not jump into the lake, adding all cancels this tolerance for exceptions: no
matter how many girls there are in the context, every single one of them needs to have
jumped into the lake for (34-b) to be true.
(34) a. The girls jumped into the lake.
b. All the girls jumped into the lake.
On the face of it, the contribution of weak all does not involve maximality of any kind,
suggesting either that maximality is not the core meaning of all, or that weak and strong
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all are distinct lexical items. The second option is clearly dispreferred in the light of our
earlier observation that weak and strong all are in complementary distribution. But before
we jump to the first conclusion, we should rule out the possibility that weak all does
express maximality, but that this contribution is somehow obscured by other properties of
weak all-NPs.
3.1.1 Hyperbolic maximality
One obvious suggestion is that weak all simply involves a hyperbolic use of all, similarly
to the way a teenager might whine “I hate everything” when they mean ‘I hate a lot of
things’. However, there are at least two reasons why such an approach is not feasible. First,
hyperbolic language use is not a lexical property, so an approach based on hyperbole could
not explain why a weak interpretation is available for all but not in equivalent sentences
involving e.g. each or every. The truth conditions of (35-a) and (35-b) are clearly distinct
((35-b) entails (35-a) but not vice versa):
(35) a. I tasted all kinds of yummy food at the festival. 9
b. 6⇔ I tasted every kind of yummy food at the festival.
Furthermore, while hyperbolic use of every in a non-maximal context can be ‘admitted’ (as
in (36-a)), such admissions are infelicitous in the case of weak all, suggesting that weak
all is inherently and obligatorily non-maximal.
(36) a. I tasted every kind of yummy food! Well, OK, I passed on the fugu sashimi.
b. I tasted all kinds of yummy food! # Well, OK, I gave the pickled durian a
wide berth.
The second reason to reject a hyperbole approach is that it fails to account for all the syn-
tactic, semantic and discourse-related differences between weak and strong all as identified
in section 2. For instance, why would prenominal allemaal accept mass noun complements
on its ‘hyperbolic’, but not on its ‘literal’ use? Why would ‘literal’ and ‘hyperbolic’ all
be in complementary distribution? Why would partitives resist ‘hyperbolic’ all? In short,
an approach that treats weak all in terms of hyperbolic or imprecise usage of (maximal)
strong all appears to be untenable.
9 In all kinds of -constructions, when the kind in question is associated with a readily accessible taxonomic
hierarchy, a strong interpretation becomes available in addition to the weak one; on this interpretation, which
I find very hard but not completely impossible to get with (35-a), it is equivalent to (35-b). I will assume
this interpretation involves quantificational all (section 2.2), applied to a set of subkinds. For the present
purpose, I am focusing only on the weak interpretation of all kinds of, which (according to my judgement)
is the most salient even in sentences like (35-a) (and can be brought out decisively by giving either kinds or
music somewhat more prosodic prominence than all itself).
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3.1.2 A covert possessive structure
In the introduction, I included allerlei ‘all kinds of’ as one of the members of the Dutch
all-family. Examining the morphological structure of allerlei somewhat more closely, we





‘of all sorts of bottles’ (i.e., an assortment of bottles)






























‘I have eaten all kinds of things.’ (Serbo-Croatian; Boban Arsenijevic p.c.)
In all these examples, the equivalent of ‘of all’ is used to convey something like ‘a sample
of all things’, resulting in a ‘many’-like interpretation reminiscent of the one triggered by
weak all. However, this ‘sample reading’ is likely the result of the use of a possessive




















‘The train was full of those stressed-out businessmen (you know the kind I mean)’.
Here too, we find an instance of an NP of the form ‘of X’ interpreted as ‘various instances
of the kind X’, an interpretation that clearly cannot be due to some unusual contribution of
all given that all is absent here. If the sample reading is introduced by the possessive, all
in the examples above can simply be analysed as ordinary, maximality-conveying instances
of all, with ‘of’ (or a genitive) picking out some subset of this maximal set, resulting in
the appearance of non-maximality.
Generalising this pattern to other cases of weak all, then, we might assume that they all
involve an overt or covert of, and that ‘weak all’ constructions as a whole are interpreted
as something like ‘a selection out of all X’ or ‘a representative sample of X’. However, there
are two problems with such an approach. First, there is no syntactic or morphological
evidence of the presence of a possessive construction in cases other than the two above (for
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example, there is no genitive in allemaal or its earlier forms). Second, while some instances
of weak all may be described in terms of a representative sample (in particular, when its
complement is kind-denoting, as in (5)), this does not hold for all of them; there is no sense
in which the combination of allemaal with a mass noun like water describes a sample or a
selection of all possible water, or all angry describes a selection of degrees of anger. I will
therefore not pursue this option for weak all in general. I will, however, assume that it is
an accurate approximation of what is going on in (37)-(38), which is why I will disregard
allerlei and van alles in the remainder of this paper. Of course, why and how possessive
constructions like (38) end up with this ‘representative sample’ interpretation is still an
interesting question, but one that does not seem to involve any unusual contribution of all
and is therefore beyond the scope of this paper.
3.1.3 Maximalisation of spatiotemporal occurrences
In section 2.3.2, we have seen that (at least some forms of) weak all are sensitive to
spatiotemporal and/or taxonomic structure of the referent, meaning that an NP like allemaal
X requires either the presence of multiple subkinds of X or the presence of X scattered across
multiple portions of spacetime. We therefore might want to entertain the possibility that
weak all expresses maximality, but in the kind or spatiotemporal domains rather than the
individual domain.
However, this possibility is not supported by the actual interpretation of weak all.
While the use of an NP like allemaal meisjes or allemaal water may only be appropriate
if the girls or water-quantities in question are scattered over multiple portions of spacetime
(or represent multiple subkinds), there is no sense in which they require their referents
to occur in all portions of spacetime (or represent all subkinds, respectively). Weak all
remains weak, even if we relocate the domain on which it operates from individual entities
to spatiotemporal or taxonomic ones.
3.1.4 Conclusion
I have considered three possible ways to maintain maximality as the core semantic contri-
bution of all and have shown that none of them are feasible. Accordingly, I conclude that
maximality is not the core meaning of all. If we want to preserve the unified analysis
of strong and weak all as suggested by their complementary distribution, we will have to
approach all’s meaning in a different way. I will outline my proposal in the next section,
drawing on familiar data involving strong all, and show how it can be extended to weak
all in section 4.
3.2 All as a plurality enforcer
I propose to analyse all as a modifier that operates on plural (i.e., nonatomic) entity
arguments and ensures that this argument remains semantically plural in the subsequent
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derivation.10 Of course, such a proposal only makes sense under the assumption that the
plural status of plural individuals is somehow unstable or under threat. In the present
section, I will argue that this is indeed the case. More specifically, I will argue that languages
have a tendency to simplify plural predication by resorting to systematic atomisation of
plural arguments, unless this move is blocked by cognitive or compositional factors which
include the presence of all.
3.2.1 Impure atomicity: some background
A recurring debate in the literature on plurals and group nouns involves data like the
following, which show that there needs to be some formal connection between the denotations
of singular collective nouns/DPs like the committee, my family, and couple, and plural ones
like the committee members and my guests.
(40) a. The committee laughed ⇔ The members of the committee laughed.
b. The committee gathered ⇔ The members of the committee gathered.
c. My family is intelligent ⇔ The members of my family are intelligent.
(41) a. [Mary and Sue / the women] are a happy couple.
b. My guests are couples from Hungary. (Schwarzschild, 1996)
(42) I met a committee of women. (Barker, 1992)
First, (40) shows that there are systematic entailment relations between plural and collective
DPs. Second, the fact that it is possible to use collective nouns as plural predicates (as in
(41)) shows that there must be a formal relation between the two: since a sentence of the
form ‘X is P’ is standardly analysed as true iff the denotation of X is a member of the
denotation of P, a predicate like happy couple must include the denotations of referential
DPs like the women or Mary and Sue. A similar argument applies to (42), where the
predicate women applies to the individual members of the committee, suggesting that the
semantics has access to the latter.
At the same time, there are many good reasons to assume that the denotations of
plurals and collective DPs are not identical (Barker, 1992; Schwarzschild, 1996; de Vries,
2017); rather, most of the evidence suggests that plural DPs refer to sum entities while
collective DPs refer to atomic ones. That means that, in order to derive the sentences and
entailment patterns in (41)-(42), we minimally need to equip our semantics with either a way
to map singular entities to plural ones, or the reverse. The first approach is taken by Barker
and Schwarzschild, who both constrain their proposed mappings from atoms to the sum of
that atom’s members in such a way that they only apply to mixed predications involving
collectives like the ones in (41) and (42); a less constrained version of this approach is
adopted by Landman (1989). The second approach, exemplified by Winter (2001), assumes
10See section xxx for a concrete implementation of this idea that also serves to highlight the semantic
similarity between this operator and quantificational all.
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that the denotation of a referential plural can be mapped to a corresponding group or impure
atom (Link, 1984; Landman, 1989).11 This approach treats sentences like (41-a) as a form
of singular predication: the sum consisting of Mary and Sue is ‘fused’ into a conceptually
complex but semantically singular individual, and the sentence is true iff that individual is
a member of the set of happy couple-entities.
(43) Impure atomisation:12
If x is a sum of entities denoted by a referential DP, ↑e(x) is the (singular) impure
atom corresponding to x.
A major difference between the two approaches is that the latter, but not the former, makes
predictions beyond the realm of collective noun interpretation. If impure atomisation is
available to the grammar, we expect to see atomic interpretations of morphosyntactic plurals
in other cases as well, not just when they appear in mixed predications with collective
nouns. That this prediction is correct is argued at length by de Vries (2015), who develops
a series of grammatical tests for both semantic plurality and atomicity and uses them to
show that morphosyntacically plural DPs tend to receive semantically singular (atomised)
interpretations when they are inanimate, but not when they are animate. For instance, in a
questionnaire study with speakers of Dutch, De Vries shows that a lack of animacy facilitates
the availability of a ‘half-of-each’ interpretation for sentences like (44). It has been argued
(Pearson 2011, based on the analysis of partitives in Barker 1998) that this interpretation
is only available when the embedded DP is atomic; for semantically plural DPs, the only
available interpretation is a ‘half-of-total’ one. Thus, while (44-b) is true in a situation in
which spilled coffee on a list of names, obliterating half of each name, (44-a) is false in a
parallel situation in which each girl is covered with mud up to her waist. Instead, (44-a)





































‘Half of the names has/have become unreadable.’ (Xhalf-of-total,
Xhalf-of-each)
11Impure atomicity is also invoked by McNally (1993) in order to deal with ‘comitative’ NPs (a special
kind of coordinated NP) in Russian and Polish, and by Kwak (2003); Joh (2008) in order to account for
certain semantic differences between two types of plural NPs in Korean.
12The ↑ notation is from Landman 1989, although I do not adopt his formalisation of impure atoms as
singleton sets of sets. The e subscript, for ‘entity’, indicates that this version of ↑ applies to pluralities of
individuals, and is intended to distinguish it from ↑k (for kind pluralities) and ↑d (for degree pluralities)
which I will propose later on.
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De Vries shows that the degree of animacy of the referent is a much more reliable predictor for
the availability of the atom-based half-of-each interpretation than the DP’s morphosyntactic
number, suggesting that atomised denotations are systematically available for inanimate
plural DPs. This observation also has the potential to account for a major empirical problem
with Winter’s impure atom shift. Because this shift, under Winter’s definition, is essentially
unrestricted, it predicts that we should always be able to substitute a plural DP for a
collective one (since the former always has the option to shift into a denotation that makes
it semantically equivalent to the latter). However, this is not the case (see also Barker, 1992;
Schwarzschild, 1996; Magri, 2012):
(45) a. The committee [has 2 members/consists of Mary and Sue/was founded in 2012].
b. *The women [have 4 members/consist of Mary and Sue/were founded in 2012].
In line with her other observations, de Vries (2015) argues that the pattern in (45) does not
represent the full picture. She shows that sentences like (45-b) are not always unacceptable:
while speakers of Dutch uniformly reject sentences like (45-b) when the subject is human,
they accept them much more often when the subject is inanimate, as in (46).
(46) De [buit bestaat/?buitgemaakte voorwerpen bestaan] uit vijf parelkettingen en zes
horloges.
‘The [loot consists/stolen objects consist] of five pearl necklaces and six watches’
Taken together, these results indicate that plural DPs are sometimes interpreted atomically,
indicating that something like Winter’s impure atom mapping must be available. Further-
more, this mapping is not freely available, but constrained by animacy. De Vries speculates
that the relevant factor is individuation in general: the less individuated a plural DP is,
the more people tend to treat it as if it were atomic. In this way, the semantic treatment
of plural DPs parallels their morphosyntax: as Corbett (2000) points out at length, nomi-
nals are crosslinguistically much more likely to be marked plural and take plural agreement
when they are highly individuated. Animacy is an important exponent of individuation;
cardinality is another one (Corbett notes that numerical DPs are crosslinguistically more
likely to lack number marking and agree in the singular when they involve high numbers).
Other likely facets of individuation are spatial configuration (things that appear and move
independently from each other are more individuated than things that usually appear or
move in groups; see e.g. Grimm (2012) on the number systems of languages like Welsh
and Maltese) and the degree to which a particular collection of individuals has a collective
purpose or function (see de Vries (2015, p.129), who discusses an earlier observation by
Mador-Haim & Winter (2015); cf. also Geurts’s (2002) discussion of the influence of ‘case
versus character’ on the way we count things).
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3.2.2 Atomisation as an economy strategy
Why, though, would people routinely take an additional compositional step (impure atom-
isation) in order to undo the semantic plurality of non-individuated DPs?
First, note that singular predication is a first-order process, while plural predication is
higher-order. Compare for instance (47-a) and (47-b):
(47) Let the set of rabbits be {m,n,a}. Let pluralisation of a set of atomic entities X
(written *X) be defined as the closure under sum of X (Link, 1983). Then
a. [[Miffy is a rabbit]] =
m ∈ {m,n,a}
b. [[Miffy and Nina are rabbits]] =
m⊕ n ∈ {m,n,a,m⊕ n,m⊕ a,n⊕ a,m⊕ n⊕ a}
Where singular predication involves checking membership of a single entity in a set of
atomic entities with cardinality n, plural predication involves checking membership of a
sum of entities in a set of sum entities with cardinality 2n− 1 - an order of magnitude more
complex. In addition, its verification process requires the semantic representation of every
individual member of the subject sum, which seems unrealistic in many real-life situations.
A point often made in the literature on collective nouns like family or committee is that
we often talk about collections of things without really knowing or caring which individual
entities make up said collection, but this observation applies to ‘ordinary’ plurals just the
same. Intuitively, when a school teacher utters the sentence in (48-a), she is not necessarily
conveying the meaning in (48-b) (to which (48-a) is technically equivalent if we analyse it
along Linkian lines, as in (47)), but rather something like (48-c).
(48) a. The children did watercolours today.
b. Sophie did watercolours today and Olivia did watercolours today and Liam did
watercolours today and Noah did watercolours today and... (etc)
c. Today’s class activity was watercolours.
Impure atomisation, then, can be seen as a way to avoid the complexities of plural pred-
ication (both its higher-order nature and the necessity of full internal representation of a
plurality). Rather than asking ourselves whether a given predicate applies to each individ-
ual member of a particular collection, we can simply consider whether the predicate can
reasonably be said to apply to the collection as a whole. In the case of (48), for instance,
the fact that watercolours were today’s ‘official’ class activity legitimises the application of
the predicate did watercolours today to the group of children as a whole, even if Sophie and
Noah ended up not participating.
Framing impure atomisation in this way also makes clear why it is linked to low individu-
ation. Individuation represents the degree to which we perceive the parts of some part-whole
structure as distinct individuals. The less reason we have to care about the individuality of
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the parts, the less important it seems to verify each part’s individual contribution to some
property attributed to the whole.
3.2.3 (Non-)maximality
As Winter (2001) notes, adopting a (more or less) freely available atomisation operation for
referential plurals allows us to account for the often-made observation that plural predication
is weaker than universal quantification, even though under Linkian assumptions, the two
are equivalent.
(49) a. Every girl jumped into the lake.
b. The girls jumped into the lake.
While (49-a) is false if some of the girls did not jump into the lake, (49-b) isn’t necessar-
ily; unlike (49-a), (49-b) is compatible with the presence of exceptions. This is unexpected
if we define semantic pluralisation of predicates in terms of closure under sum of singu-
lar predicates. In that case, if the sum entity expressed by the girls is a member of the
plural predicate *jumped into the lake, it necessarily follows that every atomic part of
said sum entity must be a member of the singular predicate jumped into the lake. In
other words, applying a pluralised predicate to a sum results in full distributivity of the
predicate to all the sum’s atomic parts. In the literature, this problem is often solved by
‘uncoupling’ pluralisation and distributivity in such a way that a sum can be a member
of a pluralised predicate even if some of its members do not share the relevant property,
for example by adopting distributivity over ‘covers’ of a particular sum rather than atomic
parts (Schwarzschild, 1996; Brisson, 1998).
However, Winter proposes to analyse non-maximality not as a property of plural predi-
cation, but rather as a consequence of singular predication over impure atoms. Thus, (49-b)
is true if the impure atom corresponding to the girls is a member of the singular predicate
jumped into the lake. What this means can vary across contexts. Perhaps a sufficient
proportion of the impure atom’s parts needs to share the property expressed by the pred-
icate (as in (49-b)). Perhaps, in some contexts, it might be enough if the property only
applies to some representative member of the group (de Vries (2017), for instance, notes
that the sentence The boys are touching the ceiling is false if one boy is touching the ceiling
while the others are just standing there, but true if the boys are forming a human pyramid
with the topmost boy touching the ceiling; in the context of our discussion in section 3.2.2,
note that the boys are highly individuated in the first case but much less in the second case,
in which they form a salient spatiotemporal unit with a collective function).
Under Winter’s assumptions, true plural predication is inherently maximal - that is, the
two sides of (50-a) are fully equivalent - whereas singular predication over impure atoms
only involves defeasible pseudo-equivalence (Winter & Scha, 2015).
(50) a. P (x) ∧ P (y) ∧ P (z)⇔ ∗P (x⊕ y ⊕ z)
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b. P (x) ∧ P (y) ∧ P (z)! P (↑e(x⊕ y ⊕ z))
We are now in a position to see how the assumption that all blocks atomisation induces
maximality: under a classical Linkian definition of the pluralisation/distributivity operator
*, maximality is simply a natural side effect of semantic pluralisation, which means that en-
forcing plural predication automatically enforces maximality.13 On the other hand, singular
predication does not formally require maximal participation of the argument’s parts, which
means that atomising a plural argument opens the door to non-maximal interpretations.
3.3 Interim conclusions
I have argued that language is subject to an economy-related preference for singular over
plural predication, which involves pressure to atomise (that is, ignore the internal structure
of) plural referents. This tendency is balanced out by individuation, which involves an
opposing pressure to preserve the internal structure and represent the parts of a whole as
distinct semantic entities. As a consequence of these opposing pressures, plural referents
with a low degree of individuation are more likely to receive an impure atomic interpretation
than highly individuated ones.14 Furthermore, I have proposed that the atomisation process
can be blocked by all, forcing plural predication. Because of the way pluralisation of
predicates is defined formally, maximality automatically follows when atomisation is blocked.
In contrast, singular predication over impure atoms allows for non-maximal interpretations.
In the next section, we turn to weak all.
4 Weak ALL
While we have technically uncoupled all from maximality, treating the latter as a formal
side-effect of all’s plurality-enforcing semantics rather than its core function, the account in
the previous section still involves a very tight link between semantic plurality and maximal-
ity. This means we do not appear to be any closer to solving the problem of non-maximal
weak all. In this section, however, I will show how weak all can be tackled when we
adopt the assumption (supported by the syntactic and semantic data in section 2) that
13For collective predication (e.g. The cats gathered on the roof ), we need slightly separate but similar
assumptions: if we assume that (1) collective predicates are those predicates that inherently include sums,
and (2) that a sum x can only be in the extension of a collective predicate P if every atomic part of x is
involved in the property expressed by P (which seems a reasonable assumption, since it is hard to see how P
could reasonably be seen to represent the meaning of some property or event if it included random uninvolved
entities too), it follows that collective predication over sums is inherently maximal. Assuming further that
collective predicates may include impure atoms in their extension allows for singular collective predication
over atoms, in which case involvement of the atom’s parts becomes a matter of pseudo-equivalence, allowing
for non-maximal interpretations.
14To borrow some terminology from Optimality Theory, the pressure to atomise can be seen as a marked-
ness constraint, while the pressure to preserve semantic plurality is a faithfulness constraint.
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weak all does not apply to individuals, but to (plural) kinds. When the resulting kind sum
is combined with an episodic predicate, the usual mechanism of Direct Kind Predication
(Chierchia, 1998) results in (weak) existential quantification over individual instantiations
of the kind. While this subsequent quantificational process largely obscures the contribution
of all, the fact that all is only defined for plural arguments ensures that it can only apply
when the kind in question has more than one instantiation, which I take to be the source
of weak all’s scatteredness effect.
4.1 Singular and plural kinds
In section 2, we concluded that strong all applies to definite expressions at the DP level,
while weak all applies to indefinite expressions at the NP level. These indefinite expressions
may be bare plurals, plural this-indefinites, or explicitly kind-denoting constructions like
kinds of X. In addition, we have argued that the complementary distribution of weak and
strong all means we should pursue a unified analysis. Since we have analysed strong all
as a function that operates on sum entities (the denotations of plural referential DPs), we
will assume that weak all operates on some kind of entity, too.
Taking our cue from the fact that English all is weak when it appears with an explic-
itly kind-denoting NP (kind/sort/manner of ), we will assume that the relevant entities are
kinds. Additional support for this idea comes from the fact that kind modification is al-
lowed in weak all-NPs (see examples (15-b) and (16-b)). Moreover, bare plurals are usually
analysed as kind-denoting, too (Carlson, 1977; Chierchia, 1998).15
We have seen that all always imposes some kind of plurality requirement on its complement,
whether that means a sum of individuals (in the case of strong all) or a sum of subkinds
or spatiotemporal locations (in the case of weak all). Hence, we have defined all in such
a way that it can only meaningfully apply to plural arguments (sum entities). This means
that a uniform analysis of weak and strong all requires some notion of plural kinds.
Such a notion is exactly what is argued for in Dayal (2004). Based on data from languages
with and without determiners, Dayal argues that definite kind reference should be analysed
in terms of an ordinary definite determiner (i.e., the iota operator) applying to a set of
taxonomic entities. This may be either a singleton containing an entity that represents the
kind as a whole (as in (51-a)), or a set of entities representing the subkinds (as in (51-b)).
(51) a. The whale is a mammal.
whale = { w }
15With respect to this-indefinites, the claim that they denote kinds has less precedent in the literature (but
see e.g. McNally 1998). Adopting this line does provide us with a new possible interpretation of the notion
of ‘noteworthiness’ as it pertains to the referents expressed by this-indefinites (Ionin, 2006): a ‘noteworthy’
referent is one who is capable of representing a kind on their own (in other words, a referent that is quite
literally ‘one of a kind’ or ‘in a class of their own’).
22
b. The orca, the porpoise and the baiji are whales.
whale = { o, p, b ... }
Crucially, Dayal assumes that the members of these taxonomic sets are atomic entities, not
sums; in order to account for the relation between these singular kind entities and individual
instantiations of those kinds, she draws a parallel with the way collective DPs relate to their
plural counterparts (cf. our discussion in section 3.2.1).
(52) a. The guinea pig makes a suitable pet for children.
⇔ Guinea pigs make suitable pets for children.
b. The committee voted on the proposal.
⇔ The committee members voted on the proposal.
The difference between Dayal’s singular kinds and the Neo-Carlsonian notion of kinds as
intensionalised maximal sums (‘plural kinds’, in Dayal’s framework) is that the latter’s
relation to their instantiations is semantically transparent. Thus, plural kinds always allow
access to the set of instantiations, as evidenced by their ability to shift to an existential
interpretation in episodic contexts ((53-b)); such a shift is unavailable for singular kinds
((53-c)).
(53) a. Chihuahuas / the chihuahua yaps rather than barks.
b. Chihuahuas were yapping all through the night.
c. # The chihuahua was yapping all through the night.
Similarly, contrasts like the one between (54) and (55) show that singular and plural kinds
parallel collective DPs and their plural counterparts, respectively, in that the latter but not
the former allow quantification over (subsets of) their instantiations or members:
(54)




have many different shapes and sizes.
support each other.







has many different shapes and sizes.
supports each other.
has mutually exclusive special abilities.

My proposal will be very much in the spirit of Dayal, involving a central role for impure
atomicity both in the individual and in the kind domain. However, it differs from Dayal’s
framework in that I will assume - in full parallel with our conclusions from the previous
section - that atomic kinds may be derived from kind pluralities by an atomisation operator
↑k. This means that kind-denoting expressions may be interpreted as semantically atomic
even if they are morphosyntactically plural. However, I will assume that the atomisation of
kinds is driven by requirements imposed by different classes of predicates, rather than by
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general economy principles.
4.2 Three kinds of predication over kinds
First, we note that different kinds of predication over kinds all behave differently with
respect to their compatibility with (strong and weak) all. Kind-level predication - involving
predicates that express properties of kinds as a whole, such as being extinct, being invented
at the start of the Industrial Revolution, or occupying a particular position in a taxonomic
hierarchy - is incompatible with all forms of all, as (56) and (57) show.











‘Eurasian otters are all mammals.’
(57) a. (*All these) common wood pigeons are widespread.
b. (*Allemaal) Europese otters zijn zoogdieren.
This behaviour parallels the behaviour of group-level predicates which express properties
of groups as a whole, like have n members or be founded in 2012, as discussed in section
3.2.1 (example (45) and further). As we saw, these predicates require their arguments to
be atomic. In line with this, I propose that kind-level predication involves predication over
singular rather than plural kinds. In the case of group-level predicates, we can diagnose this
singularity requirement from the predicate’s incompatibility with (animate) plural subjects;
in the case of kind-level properties, it is reflected in the unacceptability of all (which carries
a plurality requirement).
Generic predication is distinct from kind-level predication in that it expresses properties
that generally hold of individual instantiations of a kind, rather than of the kind as a whole.16
16The distinction between kind-level and generic predication is not always clear - for instance, being a
member of the class Mammalia is a property of kinds and not quite of individuals, but at the same time it
is expressed through a cluster of characteristics that hold of individual members of the kind (e.g. individual
mammals generally have fur or hair and females have mammary glands). Intuitively, this is why allemaal in
(56-b) does not sound quite as bad as all in (57-a). Dowty (1987) coins the term subentailment to account
for this phenomenon: subentailment is a form of distributivity where only part of the lexical meaning of a
predicate is distributed down to individual members of a plurality. Thus, while gathered in (i-a) expresses a
property of pluralities, it still has implications for each individual member of that plurality. The same does
not apply to numerous in (i-b). According to Dowty, the presence of subentailments is precisely why all is
acceptable in (i-a) but not in (i-b).
(i) a. The children (all) gathered in the auditorium.
 Each child was in the auditorium.
b. The children are (*all) numerous.
 Each child...?
With kinds, predicates that describe taxonomic hierarchies or are used to classify kinds with respect to
each other - such as herbivorous, domesticated, or suitable as pets - tend to fall into this grey area where
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When the subject is morphosyntactically plural, generic predication is fully compatible with
strong all, but not with weak all. For instance:













‘Children (all) thrive with clear rules.’
(59) a. (*All these) cats are introverts.
b. (*Allemaal) kinderen gedijen bij duidelijke regels.
Finally, episodic predication involves predicates that apply to some of a kind’s instantiations
at a particular point in time; while it can be analysed in different ways, all analyses on the
market involve some kind of covert existential quantification. Not surprisingly given this
existential character, it is the only form of predication over kinds that is compatible with
weak all:















‘(All these) hungry black-headed gulls were circling around the boat.’
Strong all is (more or less) compatible with episodic predication too:















‘Children were (all) throwing fireworks on the street.’
While sentence (61-a) sounds a bit degraded, my English informants all interpret it as equiv-
alent to ‘There were some bottlenose dolphins that all accidentally swam up the Thames
last week’, that is, existential quantification and subsequent maximisation of the predicate-
verifying dolphin sum. The same applies to the Dutch example in (61-b).
Let’s sum up. All, in general, is only compatible with predication over kinds when the
predicate expresses a property that holds of individual kind members rather than kinds as a
whole. With generic predicates, which support the inference that a particular property holds
they sound awkward with strong all but not as bad as (56-a) or (i-b), or where speakers disagree about
grammaticality (for instance, (ii-b) sounds terrible to me, but is acceptable to some of the other Dutch
speakers I consulted).













‘Guinea pigs (all) make fun pets.’
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of kind members in general, all is strong and has its familiar maximising effect (‘P holds
of every instantiation’). With episodic predicates, whether all is weak or strong depends
on its position. Prenominally, it is weak.17 In floating position (insofar grammatical), it
contributes the familiar maximising effect of strong all, but only applies post-existential
quantification (‘P holds of every member of some instantiation of which P holds’).
4.3 Analysis
In the following, I will remain agnostic on the exact nature of kinds, except for assuming
that (1) they are a type of entity that, like individual entities, may be either singular or
plural; (2) they bear a systematic relation to their instantiations, which I will formalise as
follows:
(62) Instantiation sums:
If k is a (singular or plural) kind, I(k) is the instantiation sum of k. I(k) is an
individual entity such that:
...when k is singular, I(k) is the impure atomic entity corresponding to the atomi-
sation of the sum of all k’s instantiations;
...when k is plural, I(k) is the sum of all k’s instantiations.
(I follow Carlson (1977) in not further defining the term ‘instantiation’, although if the reader
is so inclined, (62) may easily be formalised in Neo-Carlsonian terms (Chierchia, 1998). I
avoid this move in order not to bog down the analysis in this section with discussions of
intensionality.) Recall further that I am assuming that singular kinds may be derived from
plural kinds by an atomisation operator ↑k, parallel to the way impure atomic individuals
may be derived from plural ones, and that applying all blocks this possibility.
4.3.1 Kind-level predication
Unlike Dayal (2004), I do not assume that morphosyntactic plurality of the NP indicates
that it denotes a plural kind: as the observed similarity between kind-level predication
(widespread, extinct, a member of the genus Panthera) and group-level predication (consist
of linguists and philosophers, founded in 1999, have 12 members) suggests, bare plurals have
no problem expressing atomic kinds, and are in fact required to when they appear with a
kind-level predicate.18 Analysing all’s incompatibility with kind-level predication, then, is
straightforward: if the sentence subject denotes a singular kind, it is incompatible with all
in the first place, and if it denotes a plural kind, applying all blocks the atomisation with
↑k that is necessary in order to provide the kind-level predicate with an argument of the
right sort.
17Again, we disregard English prenominal quantificational all ; see section 2.2.
18Conversely, however, it does seem that morphosyntactically singular NPs obligatorily express singular
kinds; cf. the data in (53-c) and (55).
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4.3.2 Episodic predication
For episodic predication, I will follow Carlson (1977); Chierchia (1998) in assuming that
it involves a covert mechanism that fixes the type mismatch between episodic predicates
(which require individual-denoting arguments) and kind-denoting subjects. I will treat
this mechanism as a typeshift following Chierchia (1998) and also adopt his terminology
(DKP, for ‘derived kind predication’), although to be consistent with the assumptions at
the beginning of this section I will define it somewhat differently from Chierchia:
(63) Derived Kind Predication (DKP):
If P is an episodic predicate over individuals and k is a plural kind, then
P (k) = ∃x[I(k) w x ∧ ∗P (x)]
According to (63), an episodic predication over kinds P (k) is interpreted as ‘there is an
instantiation, or sum of instantiations, x of k such that P (x)’. I will assume that k needs
to be a plural kind, as we have seen in section 4.1 that singular kinds do not allow semantic
access to individual instantiations. While the proposition in (63) could logically be verified
by the existence a single atomic instantiation of k with property P , we will also assume -
as in most current analyses of the semantics and pragmatics of plurality, e.g. Sauerland et
al. (2005); Spector (2007); Zweig (2009) - that the use of a plural form pragmatically rules
out an atomic interpretation.
When plurality-enforcing all applies to a plural kind before DKP, nothing much happens
- k is plural and remains plural, and we end up with an existentially quantified denotation
along the lines in (63). In other words, the weak status of the subject NP/DP is not actually
contributed by all but by the existential quantificational mechanism built into the DKP
shift. What all does contribute in this particular derivation is an additional plurality
requirement on k: in order for all to be applicable, k needs to be non-atomic. That is,
the extension of k in a particular situation needs to involve either multiple instantiations or
multiple subkinds. When k is a mass kind, such as water, the only way to have multiple
instantiations is to exist in more than one location. I will assume that this is the origin of
the scatteredness effect contributed by weak all, as discussed in section 2.3.2.
When plurality-enforcing all applies after DKP, it is the plurality of the verifying in-
stantiation x that is enforced.19 In this case, the effect of all is again strong.
19How to ensure this compositionally is not trivial, as all needs to end up within the scope of the
existential quantifier somehow despite applying later in the derivation. It is possible an adaptation of the
DKP mechanism in terms of choice functions and wide-scope existential closure fares better in this respect
(roughly: a choice function-based DKP supplies an individual instantiation; all applies; the existence of a
verifying choice function is confirmed through existential closure). In addition, an analysis of strong all
with episodic predication should ideally account for the observation that examples like (61) are somewhat
degraded. I will leave this issue for future research.
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4.3.3 Generic predication
In order to analyse generic predication, we need some additional assumptions. While many
authors (including Carlson 1977 and Chierchia 1998) assume that generic readings are de-
rived through a dedicated covert quantifier GEN, we will instead adopt an alternative ap-
proach suggested by Dayal (2004), who proposes to treat genericity as a side-effect of predi-
cation over singular kinds in a way that essentially parallels our approach to non-maximality
in section 3.2.3. With predication over impure atoms, any implications about the involve-
ment of individual parts are due to pseudo-equivalence, which leaves room for all kinds of
non-maximal interpretations. The same tolerance for exceptions famously holds for generic
statements:
(64) a. Cats have four legs.
(compatible with the existence of three-legged cats)
b. Peacocks have incredibly colourful tail feathers.
(compatible with the existence of female peacocks)
And just as before, adding all forces a maximal interpretation (generally false):
(65) a. Cats all have four legs.
b. Peacocks all have incredibly colourful tail feathers.
In a move that further sets the present account apart from Chierchia’s - who does not
distinguish between kind-level and generic predicates - I will furthermore assume that generic
predicates, like episodic ones, require individual rather than kind arguments (after all, they
express properties of individuals; kinds do not have legs or tail feathers). This means that
we need a typeshifting mechanism analogous to DKP in order to fix the mismatch between
predicate and argument:
(66) DKP for generic predication:
If P is a (singular or pluralised) generic predicate over individuals and k is a (singular
or plural) kind, then
P (k) = P (I(k))
(with P and I(k) matching in semantic number.)
It follows that if k is a plural kind (as enforced by all), generic predication is interpreted
in terms of the application of a pluralised predicate to k’s instantiation sum. Following the
reasoning detailed in section 3.2.3, this entails that every atomic instantiation of k has the
property expressed by P . On the other hand, if k is a singular kind, generic predication
is interpreted in terms of singular predication over the impure atom I(↑kk) (the atomised
version of the sum of k’s instantiations following our definition in (62)), and is compatible
with exceptions.
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4.4 Summary and interim conclusions
The analysis presented in this section can be visually summarised as follows:
plural kind
still a plural kind












From top to bottom, we see that a plural kind can either be atomised with ↑k or remain
plural (optionally enforced by all). In the latter case, it is rendered incompatible with
both kind-level predication and non-maximal generics, in parallel to the way pluralities
of individuals are incompatible with group-level predicates and non-maximal predication.
In the former case, the resulting singular kinds may function as arguments to kind-level
predicates or to generic predicates (with a non-maximal result).
Furthermore, when all applies to a plural kind, the eventual result can be either weak
or strong depending on the type of predication. With a generic predicate, the result is
strong: plural kinds produce plural instantiation sums, and since the whole instantiation
sum functions as the argument of P , the result is guaranteed to be maximal following the
formal properties of plural predication. With an episodic predicate, the predicate’s argument
is not the entire instantiation sum, but an (existentially quantified) part of it.
Summing up, we conclude that the term ‘weak all’ to refer to non-maximal interpre-
tations of adnominal all is actually a bit misleading, as there is nothing weak about all
itself: rather, the source of this puzzling non-maximality is the inherently non-maximal
existential quantification contributed by episodic predication over kinds.
With this, we (finally) conclude our investigation of adnominal all.
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5 Extending the account to degree-modifying ALL20
We now turn to adverbial all which, as we have seen in the introduction, shows a very
similar alternation between maximal and non-maximal interpretations.
(67) a. The soil was all dried out.
b. Mary got all angry at me.
An obvious way to approach sentences like (67-b) is to assume that all here is just the
same endpoint modifier it is in (67-a), and that the acceptability of all with (some) rel-
ative adjectives shows that we can, under the right circumstances or for certain rhetorical
purposes, re-interpret those adjectives as absolute. So, the communicative intention behind
an utterance like Mary got all angry at me could be paraphrased as something like ‘Let’s
pretend that it’s possible to be maximally angry, well, that is how angry Mary got at me’.
This would allow a uniform account of the interpretation of all in degree constructions in
terms of maximality of or universal quantification over degrees, since an assertion of the
form ‘For all anger-degrees d, it holds that Mary is d-angry’ necessarily includes the maxi-
mal degree21. In line with this hypothesis, we find that combinations of endpoint modifiers
with relative adjectives are a pretty regular occurrence in informal language, and are not
limited to all :
(68) Mary is all/completely/totally/entirely obsessed with this Instagram celebrity.
A variation on this idea is to assume that degree modifiers like the ones in (68) involve
universal quantification over dimensions, effectively being interpreted as ‘X in all respects’.
Unlike the ‘absolute reinterpretation’ hypothesis above, this would explain why such end-
point modifiers are often fine with multidimensional gradable predicates (e.g. John is a
total idiot, Mary is completely obsessed), but tend to be infelicitous with one-dimensional
ones (e.g. *John is totally tall, *This coffee is entirely expensive).22 The basic idea is the
20I owe the existence of this section to Andrew McIntyre (p.c.), who sent me Buchstaller & Traugott’s
(2006) paper when I first expressed an interest in the mysteries of allemaal and all these. Without it, I
would probably not have realised the relevance of all’s degree-modifying function, and the way it parallels
the weak/strong alternation seen in adnominal all. When most of the present paper was already written,
I discovered that the alternating behaviour of adverbial all is also discussed at length in Burnett (2011),
although her analysis is quite different from mine.
21It also includes all non-maximal degrees, but since we are assuming following Heim (2000) that degree
predicates are monotone (that is, for every degree d such that Mary is d-angry, it follows that Mary is
d′-angry for every d′ < d), this would be true anyway.
22Multidimensional predicates are degree predicates that involve measurement along multiple scales, such
as healthy or geek ; they can be diagnosed using a modifier like ‘in all respects’ or ‘in terms of...’ (e.g. John is
healthy in all respects; Mary is a real geek in terms of her hobbies). In contrast, one-dimensional predicates
like tall or expensive are mentioned along a single scale (#This coffee is expensive in terms of its price;
#John is tall in every respect). See the work of Galit Weidmann Sassoon (e.g. Sassoon, 2007, 2012) for
more on the distinction.
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same, however: all degree-modifying uses of all convey maximality, either applied to a set
of degrees or a set of scales.
In principle, then, a maximality-based analysis of all can account for its intensifying
use just fine (that is, if we accept either ‘angry to every possible degree’ or ‘angry in all
respects’ as valid paraphrases of all angry). At first glance, our account of all as a plurality
enforcer might not fare so well, since the interpretation of sentences like Mary got angry
is not obviously a plurality phenomenon. However, I will argue that it can, in fact, be
analysed as such - along the lines proposed in Dotlačil & Nouwen (2016) - and moreover,
that if we do, the intensifying use of degree-modifying all follows naturally without the
need to reinterpret the adjective as absolute.
5.1 Plural degree predication and ALL
Dotlačil & Nouwen (2016) argue that comparatives like John is taller than every girl, in
which John’s height is compared to several other heights at once, involve distributive quan-
tification over pluralities of degrees. In their analysis, the denotation of the comparative
clause than every girl is a sum of degrees, where each degree corresponds to one girl’s height.
The denotation of John is taller is the pluralised set of degrees that John’s height exceeds;
so, if John measures 190cm, the set ∗[[John is taller ]] includes every degree d < 190 as well
as all possible sums of those degrees. Simplifying Dotlačil & Nouwen’s syntax and semantics
considerably:
(69) Let the girls and their heights be Sally (150cm), Helen (170cm), and Norah (180cm).
Let John’s height be 190cm. Then:
a. [[than every girl (is tall)]] = 150⊕ 170⊕ 180
b. [[John is taller]] = {...185,180, 175,170, 160,150...(etc)}
c. ∗[[John is taller]] = {...180⊕ 170⊕ 150...(etc)}
d. [[John is taller than every girl]] = 1 iff
[[than every girl]] ∈ ∗[[John is taller]]
⇔ ∀dAT v [[than every girl]] [ d ∈ [[John is taller]] ]
The equivalence in (69-d) is supported by the semantics of the Linkian pluralisation operator
∗: if a sum of degrees is a member of some pluralised set of degrees ∗P , it follows that each
atomic part of that sum must be a member of the non-pluralised set P . Consequently, John
is taller than every girl is true iff John’s height exceeds each of Sally’s, Helen’s and Norah’s
heights (which is true in this model).
If we assume that sets of degrees can be pluralised, it becomes possible to extend our
analysis of all as a plurality enforcer to degree-modifying all. Intuitively, all degree
constructions involve a comparison between different degrees, even when this is not spelled
out overtly. In the case of ‘positive form’ sentences like (70), the comparison is between
Mary’s height and some contextually derived height-standard:
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(70) a. Mary is tall.
b. Mary is tall for a women her age.
The standard is generally assumed to be calculated on the basis of a ‘comparison class’, a
set of relevant individuals, which can be expressed using a for -phrase (as in (70-b)) or left
implicit (as in (70-a)). The idea has been implemented in different forms in e.g. Bartsch
& Vennemann (1973); Kennedy (n.d.); Bale (2008, 2011); Solt (2011); Bylinina (2014).
Following Bylinina, who bases her line of argument on syntactic data from Fults (2006),
we will assume an implementation along the lines of Bartsch & Venneman and Kennedy,
in which comparison classes are introduced as arguments to the covert degree morpheme
pos (instead of modifying scales directly, as in Bale’s approach). (71) shows one way to
formalise this idea (Bylinina 2014, adapted from Kennedy n.d.):
(71) pos = λCλGλx[max(λd[G(d)(x)) > norm(G)(C)]
where C is a set of individuals of type 〈et〉, G a degree predicate of type 〈d, et〉, and
norm some function that calculates a standard degree for G based on C.
Thus, a sentence like Mary is pos tall for a woman her age is true iff the highest of Mary’s
height-degrees exceeds the degree to which women her age are generally tall.
The comparison class does not always have to be a set of distinct individuals. For stage-
level adjectives like angry - the kind of adjectives that accept intensification with all - Toledo
& Sassoon (2011) propose that the comparison class consists of distinct stages of the same
individual. A sentence like Mary is angry is then interpreted as “Mary is angrier than her
usual state”, rather than “Mary is angrier than her peers”. We will adopt this assumption.
While (71) gives us a compositional recipe for the involvement of standard degrees in
the derivation of the positive form, it does not yet tell us how such norms are calculated.
For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that grammar has some way to calculate an average
value for all kinds of degrees, numerical (tall) as well as non-numerical ones (angry). Thus,
the function norm calculates an average degree of G based on all the individuals or stages
in the comparison class. Let’s further assume that it does so by incorporating a mapping
from degree pluralities to single individual degrees - in an exact parallel to the impure atom
formation operation that transforms sums of individuals into singular group individuals.
Reflecting this parallel in our notation, we will write this mapping as ↑d.





(X) is the mereological sum of all elements in X and ↑d(y) is the average
value of the atomic parts of y.
So, at some point in the derivation of the positive form, we are dealing with a sum of degrees
representing the G-degrees of all individuals or stages in C, which is then averaged-out in
order to derive a single standard degree. In order for the sentence as a whole to be true,
this standard degree must be among the degrees exceeded by the subject’s degree of G.
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Minus the averaging-out, this is exactly the kind of derivation that Nouwen & Dotlačil
propose for plural comparatives. In order to make the parallel more obvious, we can further
decompose norm(G)(C) into a series of successively applied operations. To illustrate this,
let’s assume a model in which Mary’s degrees of anger at various representative stages in
her life (represented numerically for illustrative purposes) are 30, 20 and 10, and her current
degree of anger is 30.








We can read the formula derived in (73) in terms of the application of a predicate<(max(λd′[G(d)(x)])
to the argument 20, or, alternatively, a membership statement: in order for the formula
to be true, the degree 20 must be among the members of the set of degrees exceeded by
max(λd′[G(d)(x)]). Substituting angry for G and m for x, this means the sentences in
(70-a) are true iff 20 is among the set of degrees smaller than 30 (Mary’s current degree of
anger), which it is.
So far there is nothing really new here - we have just set up our compositional analysis
of the positive form to parallel Nouwen & Dotlačil’s analysis of the comparative, including
the presence of a sum of degrees which forms one half of the comparison. We have also
isolated a single compositional step responsible for turning this degree-sum into a degree-
atom, writing it ↑d in a heavy foreshadowing of our next move: the assumption that, just
as before, it is precisely this step that is blocked by all.
Assuming that all blocks the atomisation of a sum of degrees, a sentence like Mary
got all angry can be analysed in terms of plural degree predication, exactly along the lines
of (69) above. The only difference with Nouwen & Dotlačil’s plural comparatives is that
the argument degree-sum is derived from a covert rather than overtly expressed comparison
class. As in the case of (69) above, we will assume that sets of degrees can be pluralised
with * to yield a set of degree-sums.
(74) Let the degrees of anger of the relevant Mary-stages be 30, 20, and 10. Then
the denotation of Mary was all angry, assigned a largely covert structure roughly
paraphraseable as ‘Mary was angrier ALL than Mary was angry at her various
stages’, is derived as follows:
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a. all([[than the various Mary-stages are angry]]) = 30⊕ 20⊕ 10
b. [[Mary was angrier]] = {...30, 25,20, 15,10, 5...(etc)}
c. ∗[[Mary was angrier]] = {...30⊕ 20⊕ 10...(etc)}
d. [[Mary was all angry]] = 1 iff
all([[than the past Mary-stages are angry]]) ∈ ∗[[Mary was angrier]]
⇔ ∀dAT v [[than the various Mary-stages are angry]] [ d ∈ [[Mary was angrier]]
]
According to this, while Mary got angry is true if Mary got angry compared to her average
stage, Mary got all angry is true iff Mary is angry compared to all of the stages in her
comparison class, which necessarily involves a higher degree of anger - hence the intensifying
effect. Intuitively, the sentence can be paraphrased as something like “Mary got as angry as
ever” (perhaps, given the strongly subjective flavour of intensifying all, we can assume that
the comparison class is limited to those anger-stages that can be judged from the speaker’s
experience, resulting in the paraphrase “Mary got as angry as I’ve ever seen her”). As with
the paraphrases I tentatively suggested in the introduction to this section, it is admittedly
hard to judge whether this paraphrase accurately captures the semantics of Mary got all
angry, a construction whose usage is so constrained by contextual and sociolinguistic factors
that it is very hard to isolate any ‘pure’ model-theoretic truth conditions from it. However,
as a proof of concept, it shows that treating all as a plurality enforcer has the potential to
explain why something that looks like it should be an endpoint modifier could function as an
intensifier when combined with a particular class of gradable adjectives that lack maximal
degrees, without having to reanalyse the adjective.
5.2 ALL with absolute predicates
The account above can be extended to absolute adjectives in order to capture the max-
imising effect of all, in parallel to the way we analysed strong adnominal all in section
3.2.3. Just as before, I assume an operator ↑d that turns degree-sums into atomic standard
degrees. I will assume, following Kennedy (n.d.), that for independent economy-related rea-
sons the standard for absolute adjectives is identified with the scale endpoint, rather than a
contextual average. However, it is also often observed (e.g. Yoon, 1996; Rotstein & Winter,
2004; Toledo & Sassoon, 2011; Burnett, 2011) that this identification with the endpoint is
‘non-maximal’ in the sense that non-modified absolute degree predication is not as strict as
its explicitly endpoint-modified counterpart:
(75) a. I suppose the window is clean, but it could be cleaner.
b. I suppose the window is completely/totally/all clean, #but it could be cleaner.
c. The restaurant was already empty, but after a mouse was spotted it quickly
emptied even further.
d. The restaurant was already completely/totally/all empty, #but after a mouse
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was spotted it quickly emptied even further.
I assume that the standard degree for absolute adjectives is only ‘pseudo-equivalent’ with the
scale endpoint, just like singular predication over impure atoms is only pseudo-equivalent to
true plural predication. And just like predication over impure atoms leaves room for some
exceptions, degree predication based on an ‘impure’ standard degree leaves some wiggle room
at the top end of the scale. In contrast, blocking the atomisation of the degree-sum that
represents a scale associated with an absolute adjective ensures that the truth conditions of
e.g. The restaurant is all empty are derived through true plural predication over the sum of
degrees of emptiness; this boils down to stating that all possible degrees of emptiness must
be met or exceeded by the restaurant.
5.3 Degree-modifying ALL: conclusions and outlook
An analysis as sketched here neatly captures the observation that all functions as an
endpoint modifier when it combines with an absolute adjective, but as an intensifier when it
combines with a relative one. Beyond that, however, it leaves many questions unexplained.
For instance, it does not account for the ‘marked’ nature of intensifying all/helemaal23 nor
for more specific constraints on its use and interpretation. For example, nothing about
the analysis explains why intensifying all (unlike other intensifiers) is odd with individual-
level predication (cf. Bolinger’s (1972, p.47) observation that intensifying all is OK with
‘accidental’ but not with ‘essential’ properties):
(76) a. Mary got very/really/all angry at me.
b. Mary is very/really/??all clever.
c. Stop acting all clever.
This observation may well be related to the novelty requirement that weak allemaal imposes
on its referent: there’s a sense that the behaviour or property expressed by the adjective
needs to be new in order for all to be appropriate, while individual-level predicates, by
definition, express permanent properties. However, I will leave discourse-related questions
like this for further research. (For a related discussion on the ‘social meaning’ of intensify-
ing totally, see Beltrama (2016) - Beltrama concludes, among other things, that the use of
totally with expressions other than absolute adjectives “creates an effect of surprise and un-
expectedness”, another observation reminiscent of our discussion of the discourse properties
of weak adnominal all.)
23It bears repeating, though, that Dutch heel ‘whole/all’ is perfectly natural with relative adjectives
including individual-level ones, which suggests we do not actually want to build this markedness into the
core of our semantic analysis of intensifying all.
35
6 Remaining issues & discussion
6.1 The semantics of plurality enforcement: a sketch
So far, I have not provided an actual compositional semantics for all, only made a claim
about its effect. I will briefly sketch one possible formal implementation of plurality enforce-
ment here for the sake of explicitness.
Given that impure atomisation is defined as a sort shift on referential plural individuals
(that is, sum entities), the most obvious way to prevent it from happening involves lifting
these entities to their corresponding (plural) generalised quantifier denotations:
(77) all(x) := LIFT(x) := {P | x ∈ P}
(only defined if x is non-atomic)
This approach nicely establishes a formal relation between our plurality-enforcing all and
its quantificational cousin (All students came to the meeting):
(78) allet,ett(A)(B) = 1 iff tA ∈ B (with both A and B predicates over sums)
which means that
allet,ett(A) = {P | tA ∈ P}
In both cases, all makes sure that the only predicates included in the extension of the
DP are plural predicates that contain the sum entity associated with all’s argument. This
‘associated sum entity’ can be directly supplied by the argument (as in (77)), or, if the
argument is not a sum but a set, derived by taking the join of all the set’s elements (as in
(78)).
For reasons of space, I will leave an investigation of all the implications of this move
(especially the way it might play out in the kind and degree domains) for future research.
6.2 Variation within ALL
In this paper, I have deliberately focused on the similarities between different forms of all
(both within and between languages), in order to argue that plurality enforcement is the
semantic core of all of them. However, there are also many differences between different
forms of all that are to some extent obscured by the common semantics proposed in this
paper.
For instance, I have assumed that English all is ambiguous between a universal quantifier
(that applies to sets) and a plurality enforcer (that applies to entities), with the former
accounting for the obligatorily strong interpretation of prenominal all (e.g. all students
or all water). However, if this is true, why can’t we assign a kind denotation to students
or water and end up with a weak interpretation parallel to Dutch allemaal studenten or
allemaal water? Clearly, a bit more needs to be said about English prenominal all and its
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inability to receive a weak interpretation with complements that are not explicitly kind-
denoting.
Another remaining variation question pertains to the surprising division of labour be-
tween Dutch heel, which is ungrammatical with absolute adjectives but grammatical with rel-
ative ones, and helemaal, which is grammatical with absolute adjectives and only marginally
acceptable with relative ones. Treating them both as forms of all does not account for the
fact that helemaal shows the strong-with-absolutes, weak-with-relatives pattern character-
istic of degree-modifying all, while degree-modifying heel can only be used as an intensifier
(‘very’) even though it is clearly a member of the all-family in other contexts (e.g. heel het
dorp ‘all the village’).
Such distributional variations between, and individual restrictions on, different forms of
all will need to be taken into account in order to provide a complete syntactic and semantic
analysis of all. At the same time, I believe that the present paper presents an important
step forwards. Lumping all forms of all together might lead to a slight overgeneration, but
given that it is always possible to build in additional restrictions on particular lexical items
and take into account more contextual factors, some overgeneration is clearly preferable
to the massive undergeneration presented by maximality-based accounts of all which, by
definition, are unable to account for the many contexts in which all is non-maximal.
7 Conclusions
The central mystery of this paper involved the systematic availability of non-maximal inter-
pretations with all, despite the fact that maximality is usually treated as the core semantic
contribution of all. I have shown that, by treating all as a plurality enforcer instead, both
weak and strong interpretations of all follow from its interaction with other semantic phe-
nomena: the maximality seemingly contributed by strong all is in fact a general property
of plural predication, and the non-maximality seemingly contributed by weak all follows
either from the inherently existential nature of episodic predication over kinds (in the case
of adnominal all), or from the nature of comparison classes (in the case of adverbial all).
In the process, I have made several more general arguments: first, that the data show
the need for a notion of impure atomicity - that is, an atomic interpretation of seemingly
plural referents - and moreover, that languages employ impure atomisation as an economy
strategy. I have also argued in favour of an understanding of kinds and predication over
kinds in the vein of Dayal (2004), which as an additional welcome result allows us to do away
entirely with the ‘generic quantifier’ GEN. Finally, the paper provides support for Dotlačil
& Nouwen’s (2016) claim that semantic number is active in the domain of degrees, too.
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